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This paper investigates the effect of having a leader in a laboratory public bad experiment with 
five subjects in each group. The control treatment is a standard public bad experiment, while in 
the leader treatments the design is such that in each group the leader decides first on his or her 
investment in the public bad. After being informed about the leader’s decision, the four 
‘followers’ in each group make their investment decision. Two treatments of the leadership 
game are played with each group. In the same-leader-costs treatment, all subjects are 
confronted with the same costs, while in the no-leader-costs treatment the leader faces no direct 
costs of acting socially. It is found that followers invest significantly less in the public bad 
when there is a leader compared with a situation when there is no leader. Comparing the two 
treatments, we find, moreover, that the leadership effect is somewhat stronger when leaders 
face the same costs as followers compared with the situation in which leaders bear no costs. 
Randomly chosen leaders set an example by investing less than average players in a standard 
public bad game, and leader investments are lowest when the costs of leading are low. 
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1. Introduction 
All kinds of commons problems, like emissions of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere and 
harvesting of fish, require some sort of cooperation to avoid inefficient outcomes. This is 
suggested by theory, empirical evidence, and laboratory experiments of public bad games. 
Since the costs of inefficient management could be very large, it is important to investigate 
mechanisms that could lead to increased voluntary cooperation in the first place and to the 
establishment of institutions in the second place. One such mechanism is leading by example: a 
leader cuts back on his or her emissions or harvest and makes this known to the followers who 
are inspired by the good example to take similar actions. Leading by example is a well-known 
principle, and it has been practiced and promoted by great leaders.1 Yet nobody has made a 
thorough investigation of the effect of leading by example in public bad situations. It is the 
purpose of this paper to investigate this effect by the use of a modified public bad experiment. 
 
The traditional public bad game is altered in such a way that one subject in each group is 
randomly selected to be the leader. In each round of the resulting leader game the leader decides 
first how much to invest in the public bad. The leader’s decision is then communicated to the 
others (the followers), after which they make their decisions simultaneously. There are three 
important aspects of the design. First, by comparing outcomes of the traditional public bad 
game with outcomes of the leader game, we can investigate the effect of leadership. Second, by 
having groups playing the leader game twice, once with a leader who has the same cost 
structure as the followers and once with a leader who faces no direct costs of acting socially, we 
can study the effect of the costs of leading on followers’ behavior. Third, by choosing leaders 
randomly among the participants we are able to study how people in general behave in a 
leading role. Are they setting the good example and are they influenced by the costs of leading? 
 
Leaders can play different roles. Hermalin (1998) points out an important distinction between 
the act of influencing agents by positive incentives or coercion and the type of leadership that 
depends on voluntary actions by the followers. We consider the latter. Leaders can have better 
information than others and play the role of a teacher. For instance the leader can clarify the 
potential for increased individual utility2 by using new technologies or practices and contribute 
to reduced uncertainty and fear of failure, see e.g. Rogers (1995) on diffusion. However, we 
consider a leader who’s role is to influence the outcome of games, for instance in the direction 
                                                 
1 According to the Contemporary English Version of the Bible, Jesus said to the disciples: I have set the 
example, and you should do for each other exactly what I have done for you, John 13: 15. Mahatma 
Gandhi said: "We must be the change we wish to see in the world". Also relevant to our situation is the 
following quote by Albert Schweitzer: "Example is leadership".   
2 This role could also include teaching players about the possible outcomes of complex games.         2                       
of the social optimum. The leader’s goal may be selfish or other-regarding. This leadership task 
can be carried out with different means ranging from inspiring speeches to setting the good 
example. We investigate the good example. Finally, we note that if the leader is both a teacher 
and a player, the followers’ trust in the leader becomes an issue (Hermalin, 1998). We consider 
a game where leaders and followers possess the same information, ruling out the teacher role.  
 
There may be several motivations to follow leaders in games: Followers may think strategically 
and try to influence leaders to set the good example. Fairness considerations may lead to 
following in order to avoid inequity.3 Both these effects are likely to change when we vary 
leader costs in the experiment. Then there is a cluster of other motivations that could explain 
why people tend to follow norms, are conformists, engage in herd behavior, or simply mimic 
what others do. The treatment with no direct costs of leading should give a first indication of 
the maximum effect of all the other motivations. However, the experiment is not designed to 
distinguish clearly between motivations, it is exploratory and meant to stimulate further 
research. 
 
Several experimental studies are related to ours. Most akin is a paper by Gächter and Renner 
(2003), which examines leadership in a public good situation. The authors find that although 
leader and follower contributions are positively correlated the overall level of cooperation is not 
enhanced compared to a situation without a leader. Another class of related experiments in this 
category are public good experiments on conditional cooperation (e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001, 
Bardsley, 2000, and Weimann, 1994).4 These experiments also use a mixed design, but the 
sequencing is the opposite of the one used in our game, i.e. instead of one leader moving first, 
they have all players except one moving first (simultaneously) while one ‘follower’ moves last. 
Like in our game, the design is such that the Nash equilibrium is still that nobody contributes to 
the public good. The general finding in these experiments is that followers are conditionally 
cooperative. For instance, in a one-shot game using a variant of the strategy method, 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) find that on average the last player’s contribution to the public good is 
clearly increasing in the average contribution of other group members. They argue that 
“conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation in its own or to be a consequence of 
some fairness preferences like ‘altruism’, ‘warm-glow’, ‘inequity aversion’ or ‘reciprocity’”(p. 
397). 
 
                                                 
3 Recently, several theories have been advanced that incorporate considerations of fairness, altruism, 
reciprocity, inequity aversion et cetera (see e.g., respectively Fehr and Scmidt (1999), Levine (1998), 
Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). Factors like 
inequity aversion could be strengthened by the leader treatment. 
4 Other, related experiments include purely sequential game designs, in which all players make decisions 
in an exogenously determined order (e.g. Budescu et al., 1995, Erev and Rapoport, 1990, Morris et al., 
1995).         3                       
A second strand of related literature explicitly deals with leadership, but with a different focus. 
List and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Andreoni (1998), Romano and Yildirim (2001), and Potters et 
al. (2001) examine leadership in charitable fundraising, and in particular the effect of 
announcing the leader’s contribution on followers’ contributions. List and Lucking-Reiley 
(2002), for instance, solicited contributions from 3000 Central Florida residents, to fund a 
computer for use at the University of Central Florida. They find that increased seed money 
(which can be thought of as leader contributions) increases both the participation rate of donors 
and the average gift size received from participating donors. On the other hand, in a public good 
situation with one leader and one follower, Potters et al. (2001) find that when the quality of the 
charity (public good) is common knowledge, leader announcements are ineffective in 
increasing the overall contribution level, whereas announcements cause a substantial increase in 
contributions when leaders have private information. They argue that the results provide strong 
support for the signalling hypothesis.5 In our game there is no need for leaders to commit 
themselves (i.e. to make cutbacks in investments in the public bad) since the optimal strategy 
for followers cannot be changed (no non-linearities and no threshold levels). 
 
Hermalin (1998) develops a theory of leadership concerning teamwork in organizations and 
Meidinger et al. (2002) provide an experimental test of Hermalin’s model. Of particular 
relevance for our paper is their design in which one leader may lead one follower by example. 
In a situation where both players have the same information on the state of nature, they find that 
the leader actively tries and succeeds in inducing cooperation. They claim that leadership works 
through reciprocity: the follower wants to reciprocate the leader’s choice of an effort greater 
than the free-riding level and, knowing this, the leader induces and keeps up cooperation 
through such a choice until the last round.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section first describes the public 
bad game with and without a leader. Then it explains the experimental treatments and the 
experimental procedure in more detail, and it outlines the hypotheses. Section 3 analyses the 
data and presents the results. We find that average investments in the public bad are 
significantly lower in the leader game than in the standard, no-leader game. In the leader game, 
leaders tend to set the good example. The costs of leading appear to be important and more so 
for leaders than for followers. The last section contains a concluding discussion and gives some 
lines for further research. 
                                                 
5 Their apparent lack of a leadership effect seems to contrast the findings in this paper. Several 
differences between the designs could be responsible for this, and the most important ones are as 
follows. First of all, while our subjects could choose contributions from all integers from 0-20, their 
subjects had to make an all-or-nothing decision (0-1). Furthermore, we have repeated rounds using a 
partner design while they have repeated rounds with a strangers design.              4                       
2.  Experiment and hypotheses 
2.1.  The public bad game with and without a leader 
 
The public bad game 
The basic experimental game is similar to a standard public bad framework (see e.g. Andreoni, 
1995). Subjects play in (fixed) groups of five. In each round, subjects are endowed with 20 
tokens, and they decide simultaneously how to allocate the endowment between two projects: 
project A (the public bad) and project B. Investing in project A (B) gives a direct private return 
of 0.7 (0.4) per token invested. Besides, project A has a negative external effect: each token 
invested in this project yields a negative return of 0.1 to all group members. So, payoff π i  to 
individual i (i=1, 2, ..,5) when she or he invests  xi
A in project A and xi
B  in project B reads  
 












i i x x x π    (1) 
where  x j




B + = 20, ∀ i. Using this last equality, we can rewrite Equation 1 as 
 







i i x x 1 . 0 2 . 0 0 . 8 π    (2) 
In the one-shot version of the standard game, purely selfish, money-maximizing subjects have a 
dominant strategy to invest their total endowment in the public bad. The unique Nash 
equilibrium is thusxi
A = 20, ∀ i, which gives a total investment of 100 tokens in project A and 
an individual payoff π i  = 4, ∀ i. However, the socially optimal outcome is obtained by full 
cooperation. If all members of a group invested the total endowment in project B, i.e. xi
A= 0, 
∀ i, the payoff to each player would be twice as much, namely 8.  
 
The public bad game with a leader  
Besides the standard public bad game, we consider a so-called leader game. In this game, one of 
the five subjects in each group is randomly selected to be the leader (for all rounds to be 
played). The leader decides first on his or her investment. The leader’s investment decision is 
then communicated to the other four members in the group, after which they make their 
decisions simultaneously. Thus the leader decides first and then the followers decide 
simultaneously (the decision-making protocol is mixed sequential-simultaneous). In the basic 
leader game the pay-off function of the leader and the followers is given by (1). The 
introduction of a leader moving first does not alter the Nash equilibrium of the public bad game. 
Independent of the leader’s investment, the Nash equilibrium for selfish and rational followers 
is 
A
i x  = 20. A backward induction argument then implies an investment of 20 in the public bad 
for the selfish and rational leader as well.          5                       
 
In both the game with and without a leader, the set-up and the parameter values are rather 
standard, e.g. the marginal per capita return is similar to that in Andreoni (1995). Furthermore, 
to mimic a persistent environmental problem we adopt the partner design (Androni, 1988), i.e. 
the composition of the groups remains the same during the session. Finally, whereas in most 
public good experiments subjects only get information about the average or total group 
investment, our participants also get feedback on the individual decisions of all group members. 
This has been done to avoid asymmetries between the leader, for which the investment has to be 
revealed, and the other players.6  
 
2.2. The experimental treatments 
 
We have employed three experimental treatments: the standard public bad game without a 
leader (with simultaneous moves by all subjects), the basic leader design described in section 
2.1. and a second leader design in which the cost structure of the leader is altered  by changing 
the return on project B from 0.4 (as in Equation 1) to 0.6. We will refer to the three treatments 
by the terms “no-leader” (NL), “same-leader-costs” (SLC), and “no-leader-costs” (NLC), 
respectively. 
 
As a consequence of the higher return on project B, the direct costs of acting socially for the 
leader (i=L) are removed in treatment NLC. The leader’s profit function thus reads: 
 
    ∑ ∑
≠ =










L L x x x x 1 . 0 0 . 12 1 . 0 6 . 0 7 . 0
5
1
π    (3) 
Notice that the profits of the leader now only depend on investments in the public bad made by 
the other group members, L j x
A
j ≠ , . Hence, although the leader’s own decision has no direct 
effect on his profit, it is beneficial for the leaders if followers invest little in the public bad. So 
also in this treatment, a leader has an incentive to set the good example in order to try to 
influence the followers to choose low investment levels. In the NLC treatment, followers still 
face profit function (1). The NLC treatment does not change the Nash equilibrium of the game 
for the followers.  
 
2.3. The experimental procedure 
 
Data for the standard no-leader treatment come from two experimental sessions in which a total 
of six groups of five subjects participated. In that experiment, the 10 rounds of the standard 
                                                 
6 Experimental evidence suggests that there is no significant effect of this extra information on average 
investments in a public bad setting (Van der Heijden and Moxnes, 1999).          6                       
public bad game were run as the first treatment in the session. The second treatment of that 
experiment, which will not be discussed in this paper, consisted of another 10 rounds with a 
leader game with a slightly different design (see Moxnes and Van der Heijden, 2000, for further 
information). In the leader treatments we ran seven experimental sessions with a total of 19 
groups of five subjects. In each session we ran two leader treatments, i.e. we employed a 
within-subject design. To control for order effects we had nine groups with first 10 rounds of 
the same-leader-costs, SLC, treatment and then 10 rounds of the no-leader-costs, NLC, 
treatment, and ten groups with the reversed order.  
 
Except for the fact that there is no leader in the basic treatment while there is a leader in the two 
leader treatments, the procedures were the same in the three treatments. For instance, subjects 
were recruited from the same student population and during the same time period. The subjects 
were students from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in 
Bergen and were recruited from classes. No subject had previous experience in any related 
experiment and none of them participated in more than one session. Subjects were told that they 
could earn between NOK 100 and 180 ($12.50–$22.50 at that time) in about one hour (circa 1.5 
to 2.7 times a typical hourly wage to students). They knew that rewards were contingent on 
performance.  
 
Upon arrival subjects were seated behind computers such that groups were formed in a random 
way. The computers were separated by curtains, and subjects could not identify the other 
members in their group. Instructions (in Norwegian) were divided and read aloud by the experi-
menter. An English translation of the instructions of the SLC treatment can be found in the 
appendix.  
 
Before the first round of the leader treatments was played, the leaders were privately informed 
via the computer screen that they were (randomly) chosen as leaders in their group. Players kept 
their roles during the experiment, i.e. the leader was the same person for all (20) rounds to be 
played in both treatments. In each treatment, all parameters of the experiment were common 
knowledge to all subjects (including the asymmetry in the payoff functions between the leader 
and the followers in the NLC treatment). Subjects knew that they would play 10 rounds in the 
experiment, and then another 10 rounds with a slightly different design.7 In each round subjects 
had to decide how much of the endowment of 20 tokens they wanted to invest in project A; the 
remaining amount was automatically invested in project B. After the session, subjects were 
privately paid their earnings from all rounds. Each session lasted for about one hour, except the 
                                                 
7 The only exception is the first session of the leader experiment, which has only 8 rounds in each 
treatment. In that session we used a rather time consuming manual procedure, receiving and passing out 
information on slips of paper. The same room was used as in the computerized sessions.         7                       
first one with the two leader treatments, which lasted for one hour and a half. Average earnings 
were NOK 116.7 (≈ $15).8 The earnings included NOK 20 for showing up.  
 
2.4. The hypotheses   
 
Seven hypotheses are formulated: the first two hypotheses are concerned with follower 
behaviour (across treatments), the next two with leader behaviour (across treatments), and the 
last three hypotheses compare follower and leader behaviour within a treatment. Note that one 
could strictly speaking not talk about follower behaviour in treatment NL because there are no 
leaders and followers in this treatment. So if we talk about follower investments in treatment 
NL we mean average investments by all subjects in the group. 
 
The first hypothesis is the null hypothesis, and it concerns the effect of a leader on the followers 
in a public bad game. It formulates the game-theoretic prediction that average follower 
investments in the two leader treatments are not different from average investments in the no 
leader treatment: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Average investments in the NL treatment are equal to average follower 
investments in treatments SLC and NLC. 
 
Note that hypothesis 1 is in fact a joint test of the effect of the existence of a leader (the 
leadership design) and the extent to which the leader sets a good example. The hypothesis states 
that this combined effect does not affect average follower investments. Alternatively, one could 
imagine that there is positive effect on follower behaviour: average follower investments are 
lower in treatments NLC and SLC than in treatment NL. 
 
The two leader treatments differ with respect to the so-called ‘costs of leading’ as it is less 
costly for leaders to set an example in the NLC treatment. However, from a game-theoretic 
point of view, the costs of leading are not important to followers. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis states that the average follower investments in the two leader treatments are equal:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Average follower investments in treatments SLC and NLC are equal. 
   
The alternative hypothesis then posits that leadership has a weaker effect when the costs of 
setting a good example are lower, i.e. that average follower investments are lower in treatment 
NLC.   
 
                                                 
8 The averages are adjusted upwards for the groups with only 8 rounds per treatment.         8                       
Note that the first two hypotheses refer to average follower investments. Possible differences in 
the levels of leader investments are not taken into account. In order to be able to say more about 
leader and follower behaviour, we also have to consider leader investments.  
 
Regarding leaders, one can argue that it is not obvious whether leaders will set a good example 
in the first place. As leaders are selected randomly among the subjects, one can put forward the 
game-theoretic prediction that leaders in the two leader treatments behave like average subjects 
in treatment NL:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Average leader investments in treatments SLC and NLC are equal to average 
investments in treatment NL. 
 
Alternatively, one could hypothesize that leaders are willing to set the good example: average 
leader investments in treatments NLC and SLC are lower than average investments in treatment 
NL. If leader investments are lower, this indicates that a leadership effect in hypothesis 1 could 
in fact be caused by the good example.  
 
Next, we can test whether average leader investments are equal in the two leader treatments:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Average leader investments in treatments SLC and NLC are equal. 
 
However, it seems likely that the leaders’ decisions are affected by the costs of leading. As 
setting a good example is less costly in treatment NLC, one could thus, alternatively, expect 
lower leader investments in this treatment. 
 
The above hypotheses all compare either follower investments or leader investments in 
different treatments. Besides analysing behaviour between the treatments one can also look at 
decisions within a treatment. The last three hypotheses consider such decisions by comparing 
follower behaviour to leader behaviour within a treatment. First of all, since leaders and 
followers in treatment SLC have the same costs, one can hypothesize that they choose the same 
investment levels: 9 
 
Hypothesis 5: Average leader investments are equal to average follower investments in 
treatment SLC. 
 
                                                 
9 A comparison between average leader and follower investments in the NLC treatment is less useful as 
the payoff functions of the subjects are different in this treatment.          9                       
On the other hand, it could be that leaders are willing to set the good example, i.e. that leaders 
invest on average less than followers when they face the same costs.   
The final two comparisons are also concerned with behaviour within a treatment. However, in 
contrast to the other hypotheses, which consider average investment levels over all rounds, the 
last hypotheses look at round by round decisions. Actually, the last two hypotheses involve 
some kind of comparative-static analysis. Hypothesis 6 is formulated to test whether followers’ 
decisions are independent of a leader’s decision within a treatment:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Within a treatment, average follower investments are unrelated to leader 
investments in treatments SLC and NLC. 
 
Alternatively, average follower investments are positively related to leader investments. That is, 
a relatively low (high) investment by a leader in a particular round would result in a relatively 
low (high) level of average follower investments in the same round.    
 
Finally, we want to find out whether the leadership effect is affected by the costs of leading. 
The last hypothesis tests whether the strength of the effect is the same in the two leader 
treatments:   
 
Hypothesis 7: Leaders have the same effect on followers in treatment SLC as in treatment NLC. 
 
The alternative hypothesis in this case would be that that the relationship between follower and 
leader investments is stronger in treatment SLC when the costs of setting a good example are 
higher. 
 
We are mainly interested to see whether investment behaviour is the same in public bad 
situations with and without a leader. Secondly we want to investigate the effect of different 
costs of leading on the possible leadership effect. Our design does not allow us to fully 
distinguish between possibly competing motives for following and leading behaviour like 
imitation, provision of focal points, other- regarding motives like fairness, inequity aversion etc. 
We return shortly to these issues in the conclusions 
3.  Results 
We first present some general results, which will be used to examine the first hypotheses 
concerning average follower and leader investments. Then we take a closer look at the data by 
considering round by round data, and we use these data to perform a regression. Next, the         10                       
regression results are used to test the last hypotheses regarding the link between follower and 
leader investments.  
 
3.1. Results based on average investments over rounds 
 
3.1.1. General results 
 
Table 1 shows average investments in the public bad (project A) for the traditional public bad 
experiment without a leader, NL. The sessions are labelled X and Y. Within each session the 
groups are numbered from 1 to 3. 
 
Table 1: Average investment in the public bad in the no-leader treatment, NL 
Group      No-leader treatment 
X1  16.55   (2.43) 
X2  17.75   (1.40) 
X3  17.98   (2.46) 
Y1  17.00   (2.36) 
Y2  18.03   (2.22) 
Y3  17.60   (1.92) 
Average  17.48   (2.14) 
Note: Mean standard deviation over 10 rounds between parentheses. Data from Moxnes and Van der 
Heijden (2000) 
 
Tables 2a and 2b present the average leader and follower investments in the public bad in the 
leader treatments across all rounds for all 19 groups. The sessions are labelled A through G. 
Within each session the groups are numbered from 1 to 3, except for sessions F and G, which 
had only two groups. Session C is the manual session. We have pooled the data from all 
sessions with the same treatment order.10  
 
First we observe that for all three treatments both leaders and followers behave as weak free 
riders, as in other public good and bad experiments. Investment levels are closer to the Nash 
prediction of 20 than to the socially efficient level of zero. In the NL treatment, the overall 
average level of cooperation (defined as the percentage of the endowment not invested in the 
public bad) is 12.6%. Cooperation varies between groups (between 10% and17%), but the 
variation is small. The average level cooperation in the first 10 rounds of the NLC and SLC 
treatment is 37.1% for leaders and 23.1% for followers, i.e. the level of follower cooperation 
increases by 83%. In the second 10 rounds leaders maintain on average a high level of 
cooperation (29%) but followers do not (12.9%).  
 
                                                 
10 It is sometimes argued that contact between subjects and experimenters could influence the 
experimental results (Hoffman et al., 1991). However, as we find no significant differences between the 
manual and computerized sessions, like Bolton et al. (1998) and Weimann (1994), we treat all data as if 
they come from the same type of experiment.          11                       
Table 2a:  Average investments in the public bad by followers and leaders.  




    Leader            Followers 
No-leader-costs 
     Leader             Followers 
A1  13.30  13.18   (4.87)  11.90  15.35   (4.89) 
A2  14.00  14.35   (5.67)  15.00  17.38   (3.00) 
A3  19.20  14.43   (8.93)  18.00  18.55   (2.21) 
C1  15.63  15.47   (2.32)  13.13  17.81   (3.32) 
C2  16.25  18.28   (3.10)  12.50  17.50   (3.94) 
C3  13.75  15.16   (5.23)  10.00  15.94   (5.16) 
D1  16.00  16.18   (3.78)  5.50  17.00   (3.02) 
D2  13.50  16.43   (4.16)  8.50  15.60   (5.88) 
D3  11.50  16.33   (4.65)  13.70  18.78   (1.49) 
Average  14.79  15.53  (4.74)  12.03  17.10  (3.66) 
Note: Mean standard deviation over 10 rounds between parentheses.  
 
Table 2b:  Average investments in the public bad by followers and leaders. 




    Leader             Followers 
Same-leader-costs 
      Leader             Followers 
B1  12.50  14.48  (2.86)  19.90  19.15  (0.84) 
B2  8.80  14.38  (4.23)  14.00  16.88  (2.55) 
B3  9.00  15.40  (5.52)  17.00  18.88  (2.25) 
E1  9.70  15.90  (6.26)  15.70  17.45  (3.71) 
E2  10.00  15.13  (4.89)  17.50  18.50  (2.29) 
E3  17.00  15.50  (5.11)  12.00  15.65  (5.00) 
F1  8.80  17.03  (3.90)  16.50  19.00  (1.73) 
F2  5.50  14.25  (7.91)  12.00  15.75  (5.92) 
G1  9.00  14.93  (5.86)  16.60  17.88  (3.93) 
G2  15.40  15.15  (4.86)  17.80  18.43  (2.38) 
Average  10.57  15.21  (5.15)  15.90  17.76  (3.06) 
Note: Mean standard deviation over 10 rounds between parentheses.  
 
For the leader treatments there seems to be a consistent effect of the second treatment in a 
session. When the SLC treatment is run first, the average investment for leaders and followers 
are 14.79 and 15.53 (Table 2a) while the corresponding numbers when the SLC treatment is 
second are 15.90 and 17.76 (Table 2b). Thus average leader investments in the public bad 
increase by 1.11 and average follower investments by 2.23. The same is the case for the NLC 
treatment with average increases for leaders and followers by respectively 1.46 and 1.89.11  
 
Finally, note that the standard deviations of average follower investments in both leader 
treatments are higher than in the no-leader treatment, and that they are especially high in the 
first treatment of a session. This suggests that coordination among followers is less strong when 
there is a leader, i.e. the investment decisions within a round are more diverse.      
 
                                                 
11 It appears that the differences are highly significant for followers (p<0.01), whereas for leaders this 
holds in treatment NLC (p=0.01) but not in SLC (p=0.182).           12                       
3.1.2. Testing the hypotheses 
 
After these general observations we can now turn to the hypotheses testing. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Average investments in the NL treatment are equal to average follower 
investments in treatments SLC and NLC.  
To test this hypothesis we perform a two-sided non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests of 
differences between the average investments in the public bad in the NL treatment (Table 1) 
and the average follower investments in the first 10 rounds of the SLC treatment (Table 2a), and 
the first 10 rounds of the NLC treatment (Table 2b) respectively i.e. two between–subjects 
comparisons.12 It turns out that average follower investments in the NL treatment are 
significantly higher than in the SLC treatment (p=0.013, n1=6, n2=9). Similarly, the average 
follower investments in the NL treatment are significantly higher than in the NLC treatment 
(p=0.002,  n1=6,  n2=10). Hence we reject Hypothesis 1, i.e. there seems to be an effect of 
introducing a leader in a public bad game. Note that, as we remarked when we formulated 
hypothesis 1, we test for a joint effect of the existence of a leader and the good example set by 
the leader. In section 3.2 we will perform a regression with round data in order to try to 
disentangle these two effects.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Average followers investments in treatments SLC and NLC are equal. 
Using a two-sided non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test on the pooled data 
of all sessions with a leader (within subjects) we find no significant difference between average 
follower investments in the two leader treatments SLC and NLC (p=0.305,  n1=n2=19). 
However, although it seems that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average follower 
investments in both leader treatments are equal, one should take into account that average 
leader investments need not be equal in both treatments. Indeed, Tables 2a and 2b show that 
leaders invest less in the NLC treatment than in the SLC treatment (see Hypothesis 4 for a 
formal test). This suggests that when cooperative behaviour is not costly for the leaders it 
requires significantly lower leader investments in the public bad to get the same level of 
average follower investments. The analysis in section 3.2 with round data will provide us with 
additional information for this hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Leader investments in treatments SLC and NLC are equal to average investments 
in treatment NL. 
                                                 
12 To keep the comparison clean we use data only from the first 10 rounds of the SLC and the NLC 
treatment and compare them to the data from the NL treatment, which also came first. Data from the 
second 10 rounds of leader treatments are not suited for this comparison, as subjects’ behavior in the 
second leader treatment may be affected by decisions in the first leader treatment.          13                       
Here we use a Mann-Whitney U test to compare the average investments in the public bad in 
the first 10 rounds of the NL treatment (Table 1) to the average leader investments in the first 
10 rounds of the SLC treatment (Table 2a), i.e. between subjects. The difference turns out to be 
highly significant (p=0.012, n1=6, n2=9). Similarly, average leader investments in the first 10 
rounds of treatment NLC (Table 2b) are significantly lower than average investments in the first 
10 rounds of the NL treatment (p<0.01, n1=6, n2=10). We thus reject Hypothesis 3 in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis that leaders are willing to set the good example when put in a leading 
position.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Leader investments in treatments SLC and NLC are equal. 
When discussing hypothesis 2 we already noticed that leaders invest less in treatment NLC than 
in treatment SLC. A formal test confirms that the difference is statistically significant (p=0.036, 
n1=n2=19), resulting in a rejection of hypothesis 4. So, not surprisingly, leaders are affected by 
the costs of leading, i.e. when it is less costly they are more inclined to set a good example.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Average leader investments are equal to average follower investments in 
treatment SLC. 
In treatment SLC, the payoff function of leaders and followers is the same, so one might expect 
that the average level of investments in the public bad is the same. However, using a within-
subjects Wilcoxon tests it turns out that leaders invest on average significantly less than 
follower do (p<0.01, n1=n2=19). Hence we can reject hypothesis 5. Although leaders have the 
same costs as followers they tend to set a good example by investing, on average, less than 
followers.   
 
The first five hypotheses have considered averages over rounds. The remaining two hypotheses 
are concerned with variations over rounds in leader and follower decisions, within treatments. 
In the next section we will first present some general findings based on these data and then we 
will formally test the last two hypotheses. 
 
We conclude this section by paying some attention to the monetary consequences of the 
investment decisions for the subjects. In the SLC treatment both leaders and followers are on 
average better off than the average subject in the NL treatment (considering only the first 10 
rounds). As a result, average group payoffs increase from 22.5 in the NL treatment to 24.6 in 
the SLC treatment. The institution of a leader thus leads to an increase in total average payoffs 
of 9.3%. In the NLC treatment the effect is somewhat larger, partly due to the lower leader 
costs.  
 
3.2. Results based on investments round by round  
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In this section we examine the time-series data, and in particular the data from the leader 
treatments. First we look more closely into the individual investment decisions, because they 
give additional insights in leader and follower behaviour and in variations in the decisions 
within the treatments. Then we look at the evolution of the investments over time. After that, 
we perform a regression and we use the regression results to test the remaining two hypotheses. 
 
3.2.1. Individual investment decisions 
 
Figures 1a-1d present the frequency distributions of all investment decisions for leaders and 
followers by (leader) treatment and by order (first or last ten rounds). Figures 1a and 1b also 
display the frequency distribution of the investments in the no-leader treatment. The 
investments are grouped in intervals of 3 tokens. These distributions tell a more detailed story 
than the averages analysed in the previous section. The general impression is the same for all 
figures: the modal investment interval for leaders and followers is the interval from 18 and 20 
(and most investments are actually 20), and the distributions of the investments look very 
similar. In the NL treatment, the frequency distribution is even more concentrated in the higher 
intervals: Investments below 10 are very rare in this case. Differences in distributions between 
leaders and followers are smaller in the SLC treatment than in the NLC treatment (compare 
Figure 1a with 1b and 1c with 1d). When it is not directly costly for them, leaders choose 
relatively more often 0 and less often 20. A final observation from the figures is that the 
distributions shift to the right from the first ten to the second ten rounds of the same treatment 
(compare Figure 1a with 1c and 1b with 1d). 
 
[Insert Figures 1a-1d about here] 
 
Next we use the individual investment decisions in the leader treatments to classify the subjects 
into different types. At least three different types of subjects or behaviour can be distinguished. 
The first type of behaviour is free-riding behaviour. We call subjects free riders (within a 
treatment) if they invest 20 in all rounds of that treatment with at most two exceptions. Note 
that both followers and leaders can be free riders. A next class of subjects (only followers) are 
conditional followers.13 A follower is called a conditional follower (within a treatment) if 
across all rounds of that treatment the correlation coefficient between the subject’s own 
investments and the leader’s investments is significant at the 5%-level. For leaders the second 
class consists of the so-called cooperative types, i.e. leaders who contribute on average not 
more than 10 within a treatment. The last category consists of subjects whose behaviour does 
                                                 
13  Subjects who could be classified as both free rider and conditional follower (within a treatment) are 
labeled conditional followers.            15                       
not belong to any of the other two categories. Decisions made by subjects in this category are 
called random behaviour.  
 
If we organize the subjects according to this classification we find that 5 out of 19 leaders are 
free riders (26%) in one treatment (4 in treatment SLC, and 1 in treatment NLC). A total of 10 
leaders (53%) behave cooperatively, all in treatment NLC (see also Tables 2a and 2b). Five 
leaders (26%) behave randomly in both treatments, whereas 10 (3) leaders show no clear 
behavioural pattern in treatment SLC (NLC). With respect to followers, it turns out that the 
number of free riders and conditional followers is about the same: 29 out of 76 followers (38%) 
free ride in at least one treatment (14 (10) in treatment SLC (NLC) and 5 in both treatments) 
and 26 followers (34%) seem to follow the leader (15 (4) in treatment SLC (NLC) and 7 in both 
treatments). The remaining 21 followers (28%) show no clear behavioural pattern in any of the 
two treatments.14 A last thing to note is that there is less random behaviour in the second 
treatment of a session random, which suggests that subjects are more inclined to follow a 
typical pattern or strategy when they are (more) experienced.  
 
3.2.2. Development over rounds  
 
In order to examine the evolution of investments, Figures 2a and 2b show the average 
investments in the public bad for leaders and followers in the leader treatments, round by round, 
as well as the average investments in the first 10 rounds of the no-leader treatment. The dashed 
lines represent average follower investment, the thick solid line average leader investments, and 
the thin solid line displays average investments in the standard public bad game. Figure 2a 
relates to the sessions with the treatment order SLC-NLC while Figure 2b relates to the sessions 
with the reversed order. Obviously, average leader, follower, and no-leader investments show a 
tendency to increase across rounds. The observed patterns are similar to the patterns typically 
found in standard public good and public bad experiments (Ledyard, 1995). Furthermore, as 
regards the comparison between the no-leader and the leader treatments, it turns out that in 
almost all rounds leaders invest on average less in the public bad than no-leaders. Average 
follower investments start at a lower level than in the no-leader treatment, but while in the NLC 
treatment the difference seems to last until the last round, the average follower investments in 
the last rounds of the SLC treatment are similar to the average investments in the no-leader 
treatment.  
 
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
                                                 
14 The results from this classification are remarkably similar to those found in related experiments. 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50% are 
conditional cooperators. In their sequential treatment Potters et al. (2001) find that conditional on the 
first mover contributing, the second mover contributes in 33.3% of the cases.            16                       
 
Concerning the leader treatments, the figures suggest first of all the presence of a kind of restart 
effect treatments: leaders and followers contribute on average more in the first round of the 
second treatment within a session (after the restart) than in the last round of the first treatment 
(before the restart). This effect is strongest when the treatment order is SLC-NLC.   
 
From the figures it seems that particularly in the early rounds leaders try to set the good 
example. However, even in the NLC treatment the average leader do not go all the way toward 
zero investments in the public bad. Actually, a closer inspection of the data reveals that 11 out 
of 19 leaders set the best possible example in the first round of the NLC treatment (by investing 
zero in the public bad), versus 4 out of 19 leaders in the SLC treatment. 15 
 
The figures presented in this section concern round data, averaged over groups. These aggregate 
values conceal specific patterns in leader and follower behaviour, which may be present in 
various groups.16 The analysis in the next section takes these variations into account.  
 
3.2.3. Test of the hypotheses by regressions over rounds 
 
To elaborate on the behaviour of subjects within a treatment we use time-series data. In 
particular, we will examine the effect of leaders on followers in the two leader treatments. To 
that end we perform a regression, which tries to explain follower behaviour by leader 
investments in the public bad for the treatments SLC and NLC. The results are mainly used to 
test hypotheses 6 and 7, but will also be related to hypotheses 1 and 2.   
 
The dependent variable in the regression equation is a vector consisting of the average follower 
investment in the public bad 
F
t i x ,  for group i in round t. We estimate the following model in 
which we have included fixed effects for the groups: 
 










t i x ,  is the investment in the public bad by the leader of group i in (the same) round t. The 
dummy variable  i N  takes the value 1 for treatment NLC (and zero otherwise). The dummy 
variable  i R  takes the value 1 if it concerns rounds in the second treatment of a session, i.e. after 
the restart, (and 0 otherwise). The error term in the fixed effect model is specified as εi,t = µi + 
                                                 
15 At the same time, 2 (4) leaders set the worst possible example by investing 20 in the public bad in the 
first round of treatment NLC (SLC). The treatment order seems not important in this respect. 
16 In several groups one can observe that average follower and leader investments seem to ‘move 
together’, whereas in other groups the average follower investment seems almost unrelated to (variations 
in) leader investments.          17                       
υi,t, where the µi denote the unobservable group-specific effects and the υi,t denote the remainder 
disturbances, υi,t are iid (0, σν
2), independent of each other and of the explanatory variables. The 
regression results are depicted in Table 3.17 
 
Table 3: Estimation results for follower investments (group averages) in the public bad. 
Variable Symbol  Coefficient  p-value 
Constant  α 0  10.53 0.000 
Leader investment, SLC treatment  α 1  0.18 0.000 
Leader investment, NLC treatment  α 2  0.06 0.018 
Effect of NLC treatment  α 3  1.64 0.010 
Round number  α 4  0.43 0.000 
Second treatment effect  α 5  1.93 0.000 
Note: R
2=0.35, F=39.73, number of observations n=368. 
 
The results illustrate that there is a significant upward trend in average follower investments 
over rounds (as we have seen in Figures 2a and 2b). The second treatment in a session has a 
significantly positive effect, implying that the average follower investments in the public bad 
are higher in the second 10 rounds of a session than in the first 10 rounds.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Within a treatment, average follower investments are unrelated to leader 
investments in treatments SLC and NLC. 
Significant estimates for α 1=0.18 and α 2=0.06 provide evidence against this hypothesis, i.e. 
followers tend to follow (variations in) leader behaviour. Thus the size of the leader investment 
seems to matter, although the effect is not very large. This limited effect of the leader 
investment level suggests that the effect of leadership found when testing Hypothesis 1 is due to 
both the existence of a leader and the extent to which a leader sets a good example. Hypothesis 
1 relied on a test of the joint effect. 
  
Hypothesis 7: Leaders have the same effect on followers in treatment SLC as in treatment NLC. 
A first reason to reject this hypothesis is the fact that α 1 is significantly higher than α 2 
(p<0.001), indicating that followers react stronger to variations in leader investments when 
setting the good example is costly for the leaders. A second reason to reject the hypothesis 
is the fact that α 3 is significantly greater than zero, i.e. followers invest on average 1.64 tokens 
more to the public bad in the NLC treatment than in the SLC treatment. This indicates that the 
mere existence of leader costs (as opposed to no costs) matter for the followers.  
                                                 
17 The regression results are robust to the specification chosen. For instance, they do not change if we 
include random instead of fixed effects or no fixed effects, if we allow for different round effects in the 
two treatments, if we include a dummy variable for the manual session, if we add an interaction term for 
treatment and treatment order, if we include the average follower investment in the previous round, or if 
we use a forward or stepwise selection procedure. Furthermore, the results are virtually identical if we 
use individual follower investments instead of average follower investment as the dependent variable, 
but the estimates become generally more significant.           18                       
 
It may seem contradictory that we reject Hypothesis 7 while we accepted Hypothesis 2 (equal 
average follower investments in SLC and NLC). However, similar to the comment under 
Hypothesis 6, the similarity between follower in SLC and NLC in Hypothesis 2 seems to be 
caused by the fact that the size of leader investments matters. Strong examples and weak 
following in NLC leads to the same average results as weak examples and strong following in 
SLC. 
4.  Conclusions  
We have investigated the effect of having a leader in a laboratory public bad experiment with 
five subjects in each group. The control treatment was a standard public bad game (with 6 
groups), while in the leader treatments (19 groups) the design was such that in each group one 
subject was randomly selected to be the leader. In the leader game the leader decided first on 
his or her investment in the public bad, and after being informed about the leader’s decision, the 
four ‘followers’ in each group made their investment decision. Thus the decision protocol was 
mixed sequential-simultaneous. The leader game was played twice with each group, with two 
treatments. In the same-leader-costs treatment (SLC), all subjects were confronted with the 
same costs, while in the no-leader-costs treatment (NLC) the leader faced no direct costs of 
acting socially. 
 
Seven hypotheses were tested with the following main conclusions. In both leader treatments 
the average level of follower investments is significantly lower than the average level of 
investments in a standard public bad game. The introduction of a leader results in levels of 
cooperation that are 77% (90%) higher in treatment SLC (NLC) compared with the no-leader 
treatment (first 10 rounds). In both leader treatments leaders invest significantly less than the 
average player in the no-leader treatment, which implies that leaders are willing to set an 
example. Consequently, in the SLC treatment (and in the NLC treatment) both leaders and 
followers earn on average more than the average subject in the no-leader treatment (considering 
the first 10 rounds). Furthermore, the results of a regression with round data show that follower 
behaviour is positively related to leader behaviour in both leader treatments, but that leaders 
have a stronger effect on followers when the costs of leading are higher. In total, our results 
suggest that there are two effects of leading by example: first the mere existence of a leader 
matters, and, secondly, the size of the example is also important. 
 
The main purpose of the paper has not been to test explanations for leadership effects, however 
certain suggestions emerge from the results. Followers have an incentive to behave strategically 
by following the leader from round to round to such an extent that the leader finds it profitable         19                       
to lead as much as possible. If the followers were really smart they should combine this strategy 
with no willingness to cooperate unless the leader set a good example. Our regression results 
suggest that such a strategy is not a dominating motivation for following (rather weak round to 
round following and a positive effect of having a leader present).  
 
The fact that followers follow more strongly when leaders have a direct cost of setting the good 
example suggests that fairness (inequity aversion) or strategic behavior is important for the 
leadership effect. The fact that we see effects of leadership in the no-leader-cost treatment 
cannot be used to conclude firmly that other motivations than strategy and fairness are in place. 
However, this treatment also implies that we cannot rule out other motivations. 
 
Leaders seem to believe in the effect of leadership and they are sensitive to costs. In the no-
leader-cost treatment their investments in the public bad increase considerably over time. This 
could be strategically motivated (punishment), but we cannot fully rule out inequity aversion.18 
 
We conclude by saying a few words about the applicability of our results in the real world. Like 
previous public good and bad experiments, the leadership experiment was designed to 
investigate the core of the gaming situation. As such it says something about general, 
underlying tendencies to cooperate, to set good examples and to follow leaders (see Smith 
(1982) on parallelism). The experiment was not designed to maximize external validity, e.g. 
there is no communication (see Bohnet and Frey (1995), Isaac and Walker (1988b) and Isaac 
and Walker (1991)), no institutions for negotiations of allowable quotas and laws determining 
punishment (see Bianco and Bates (1990) for a theoretical discussion and Ostrom et al. (1992) 
for empirical evidence), full information about others and no distorted or missing media 
coverage, no political processes, no NGOs such as environmental groups and polluter organiza-
tions, and only four followers. Hence real life effects of leaders could be both larger and smaller 
than the effects found here. The effects of all the left-out factors are interesting topics for 
further research.  
                                                 
18 Indeed, inequity aversion could also (partly) explain leaders’ behavior. Obviously, in treatment SLC 
relatively low leader investments lead to relatively low leader payoffs and relatively high follower 
payoffs, so also to increased inequity between leaders and followers. In treatment NLC, it may seem that 
leaders do to suffer from low investments (as the higher rate of return for leaders in this treatment leads, 
ceteris paribus, to higher leader payoffs), Note, however, that followers also benefit from a relatively 
low leader investment, and therefore inequity can also occur in this treatment. So, if leaders are inequity 
averse they may want to reduce inequity by increasing their investments if they experience that followers 
choose relatively high levels in treatment NLC.           20                       
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Appendix: Instructions for the experiment 
This appendix contains an English translation of the instructions for the same- leader-costs 




This is an experiment to investigate investing behaviour. The instructions are simple. If you 
follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. Earnings will be paid in 
cash immediately after the experiment. In addition, you receive NOK 20 for showing up. The 
money has been supplied by the Norwegian Research Council. 
  
In the experiment you first have to make 10 investment decisions, one in each round. After that 
we will change the design slightly and there will be 10 additional decision rounds. The payoffs 
of all 20 rounds determine your total earnings. 
  
During the experiment you belong to a group together with four other subjects, which are the 
same persons all the time. Your payoffs will depend on your own decisions and on what the 
other four members of your group decide. The design is such that nobody is able to find out 





INVESTMENTS AND PAYOFFS 
In each round, you (and all others in your group) can invest an endowment of NOK 20. So, in 
total, NOK 100 per round is invested. You can invest in two different projects: project A and 
project B. You write down how much you want to invest in project A, the rest of your 
endowment is then automatically invested in project B. Project A yields a direct payoff of NOK 
0.70 per crown invested. Note, however, that in addition to the payoff for yourself, investing in 
project A yields an additional cost of NOK 0.10 per crown invested for you and the other four 
members in your group. Similarly, investments in project A by the other members gives a cost 
for you and the other subjects. Project B yields a direct payoff of NOK 0.40 per crown invested. 
Investments in project B have no (indirect) impact on the payoffs for others. All persons in a 
group are in the same position. 
  
To make it easier to see the consequences for your payoffs of the investment decisions made by 
you and the others, we have computed the payoffs for several combinations. To limit the size of 
the table we only mention investments in steps of 5. However, you can use all integers from 0 
up to and including 20 when you choose your investment in project A. 
 
An example shows how the numbers in the table are computed. Assume that you invest NOK 
10 in project A. Then you receive a direct payoff of NOK 7 from project A. The rest of your 
endowment, NOK 10, is automatically invested in project B, and yields a payoff of NOK 4. 
Together this generates a direct payoff of NOK 11. Assume furthermore that the other four 
persons in your group invest on average NOK 5 in project A. That gives a total investment of 
NOK 20 in project A for these four persons. Together with your own investment of NOK 10 
this gives a total investment in project A of NOK 30. This yields a cost of NOK 3 for you (and         23                       
for the others). A direct payoff of NOK minus a cost of NOK 3 gives your own payoff of NOK 
8. 
 
      Table to calculate your own payoff per round 
Average investment 
in project A 
by others 
Your own investment 
In project A 
  0 5 10  15  20 
0  8 9 10  11  12 
5  6 7 8 9 10 
10  4 5 6 7 8 
15  2 3 4 5 6 





Before you, at your monitor you see three windows. There is one window with two buttons to 
click on, one to send your investment decision, the other one to receive information. You 
should only click on these buttons when the experimenter tells you to do so, in order to 
synchronize the game. The investments are entered in the box “Investment in A” in the 
“Decision” window. In this window you must also enter the number of the round, which will be 
called out by the experimenter in each new round. After you have filled in this window, it is 
necessary that you push the “Invest”-button twice. The investment decision is sent when there is 
a sound from your computer. The same sound is made when you click on “Get Information”.  
 
The window “Information” shows your last investment in project A, and the payoff for that 
round. The window also shows how much the other four subjects in your group have invested in 
the previous round.  
 
The next paragraph was skipped in the no-leader treatment. 
[In each group, one subjects is selected to be the leader for all rounds to be played. Before the 
other subjects decide, they get to see the leader’s investment in project A in the round. The 
subjects that are selected as leaders see this in the “Information” window. I will use the 
expressions “leader” and “others”.]  
 
After 10 rounds we inform you about the changes in the rules for the last 10 rounds. 
 
For your own sake, and for our sake in case something goes wrong with the computer or the 
network, please fill in your investment in project A for every round at the enclosed form. At the 
end, you sign the form such that we have a receipt for the payoffs. Your payoffs are tax-free.  
 
Do not look at other monitors and do not communicate with any of the other participants. You 
can now ask questions for clarification. 
  
Good luck. 


















Figure 1a: Frequency distribution of investments in the public bad in the NL treatment and by 






















Figure 1b: Frequency distribution of investments in the public bad in the NL treatment and by 










0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-17 18-20



























0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-14 15-17 18-20




































Figure 1c: Frequency distribution of investments in the public bad by leaders and followers 





















Figure 1d: Frequency distribution of investments in the public bad by leaders and followers 
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Figure 2a: Development of the average investment in the public bad across rounds for followers 


























Figure 2b: Development of the average investment in the public bad across rounds for followers 
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